Judgment Ricci v. DeStefano

1 judgment

1.1 district court
1.2 second circuit
1.3 supreme court
1.4 concurrence
1.5 dissent

judgment
district court

judge janet bond arterton in federal district court ruled city, granting motion summary judgment.

second circuit

on appeal, three-judge panel of second circuit court of appeals (pooler, sack , sotomayor, c.jj.) heard arguments in case of discrimination. judge sotomayor (who subsequently elevated associate justice u.s. supreme court) vigorously questioned attorneys in case, , repeatedly discussed whether city had right attempt reformulate test if afraid original test discriminatory or result in litigation. three-judge panel affirmed district court s ruling in summary order, without opinion, on february 15, 2008.

after judge on second circuit requested court hear case en banc, however, panel withdrew summary order. on june 9, 2008 issued instead unanimous per curiam opinion. panel s june 9, 2008 per curiam opinion 8 sentences long. characterized trial court s decision thorough, thoughtful , well-reasoned while lamenting there no alternatives in case. panel expressed sympathy plaintiffs situation, particularly ricci s, concluded civil service board acting fulfill obligations under title vii [of civil rights act]. panel concluded adopting trial court s opinion in entirety.

a petition rehearing en banc denied on june 12, 2008 vote of 7-6. judge josé cabranes , chief judge dennis jacobs wrote opinions in dissent denial of rehearing, urging review supreme court.

the supreme court granted certiorari , heard oral arguments on april 22, 2009.

supreme court

the court held city of new haven violated civil rights act of 1964, title vii discarding test scores. said city failed establish genuine dispute examinations job-related , consistent business necessity. in majority s view, employer should have demonstrate[d] strong basis in evidence that, had not taken action, have been liable under disparate-impact statute.

the supreme court upheld fairness , validity of examinations ios developed , administered. ios illinois company specializes in designing entry-level examinations , promotional examinations fire , police departments; , other public safety , corporate organizations. court cited examples of how ios test design, criteria, , methodology included: interviews, observations, education, test format compliance, , independent assessors. information, ios produced test reduced adverse impact protected class.

supreme court justice anthony kennedy wrote, “in order fit examinations new haven department, ios began test-design process performing job analyses identify tasks, knowledge, skills, , abilities essential lieutenant , captain positions.”

the process ios used design test job analyses portion included interviews of incumbent captains , lieutenants , supervisors, , ride-along observations of other on-duty officers. using information, ios wrote job-analysis questionnaires , administered them of incumbent battalion chiefs, captains, , lieutenants in department. ”

kennedy j continued, @ every stage of job analysis, ios, deliberate choice, over-sampled minority firefighters ensure results ios use develop examinations—would not intentionally favor white candidates.

kennedy j included in opinion following procedures ios used develop written examinations measure candidates job-related knowledge. “ios compiled list of training manuals, department procedures, , other materials use sources test questions , received approval new haven fire chief , assistant fire chief. then, using approved sources, ios drafted 100 question multiple-choice test written below 10th-grade reading level. city opened 3-month study period in gave candidates list identified source material (or references list) questions, including specific chapters questions taken.”

ios developed oral examinations concentrated on job skills , abilities. using job-analysis information, ios wrote hypothetical situations test incident-command skills, firefighting tactics, interpersonal skills, leadership, , management ability, among other things. candidates asked these hypotheticals , had respond panel of 3 assessors.

the court agreed ios demonstrated due diligence by, “assembling pool of 30 assessors superior in rank positions being tested. @ city s insistence (because of controversy surrounding previous examinations), assessors came outside connecticut. ”ios submitted assessors resumes city officials approval. battalion chiefs, assistant chiefs, , fire chiefs departments of similar sizes new haven s throughout country. sixty-six percent of panelists minorities, , each of 9 three-member assessment panels contained 2 minority members. received training on how score candidates responses consistently using checklists of desired criteria.

section ii-a reiterated doctrines underlying disparate-treatment claim.

first, kennedy rejected arguments city did not discriminate. engaged in express, race-based decisionmaking (i.e., disparate treatment/intentional discrimination) when declined certify examination results because of statistical disparity based on race — i.e., how minority candidates had performed when compared white candidates . district court wrong argue respondents motivation avoid making promotions based on test racially disparate impact ... not, matter of law, constitute discriminatory intent. argument turns upon city s objective — avoiding disparate-impact liability — while ignoring city s conduct in name of reaching objective.

second, kennedy examined statutory framework of title vii, determine whether title vii s proscription of disparate treatment afforded lawful justifications in disparate impact provision seems conflict with. looking analogous equal protection cases, reached statutory construction that, in instances of conflict between disparate-treatment , disparate-impact provisions, permissible justifications disparate treatment must grounded in strong-basis-in-evidence standard.

he concluded once [a] process has been established , employers have made clear selection criteria, may not invalidate test results, upsetting employee s legitimate expectation not judged on basis of race. doing so, absent strong basis in evidence of impermissible disparate impact, amounts sort of racial preference congress has disclaimed, §2000e–2(j), , antithetical notion of workplace individuals guaranteed equal opportunity regardless of race.

he rejected petitioners strict approach, under title vii, avoiding unintentional discrimination cannot justify intentional discrimination. assertion ignores fact that, codifying disparate-impact provision in 1991, congress has expressly prohibited both types of discrimination, , render statutory provision dead letter .
he rejected petitioners suggestion employer must in violation of disparate-impact provision before can use compliance defense in disparate-treatment suit. rule run counter have recognized congress s intent voluntary compliance preferred means of achieving objectives of title vii. forbidding employers act unless know, certainty, practice violates disparate-impact provision bring compliance efforts near standstill. in limited situations when restricted standard met, employers hesitate before taking voluntary action fear of later being proven wrong in course of litigation , held account disparate treatment.
he rejected respondents position employer s good-faith belief actions necessary comply title vii s disparate-impact provision should enough justify race-conscious conduct. position ignore original, foundational prohibition of title vii, bars employers taking adverse action because of ... race. §2000e–2(a)(1); , when congress codified disparate-impact provision in 1991, made no exception disparate-treatment liability actions taken in good-faith effort comply new, disparate-impact provision in subsection (k). respondents policy encourage race-based action @ slightest hint of disparate impact — e.g. causing employers discard results of lawful , beneficial promotional examinations there little if evidence of disparate-impact discrimination — amount de facto quota system, in focus on statistics ... put undue pressure on employers adopt inappropriate prophylactic measures. operational principle not justified, title vii express in disclaiming interpretation of requirements calling outright racial balancing. §2000e–2(j). purpose of title vii promote hiring on basis of job qualifications, rather on basis of race or color.
he cited justice powell who, announcing strong-basis-in-evidence standard plurality in wygant v. jackson board of education, recognized tension between eliminating segregation , discrimination on 1 hand , doing away governmentally imposed discrimination based on race on other, stating related constitutional duties not harmonious, , reconciling them requires ... employers act extraordinary care. plurality required strong basis in evidence because [e]videntiary support conclusion remedial action warranted becomes crucial when remedial program challenged in court nonminority employees. court applied same standard in richmond v. j. a. croson co., observing amorphous claim there has been past discrimination ... cannot justify use of unyielding racial quota.
the same interests @ work in interplay between disparate-treatment , disparate-impact provisions of title vii: congress imposes liability on employers unintentional discrimination, in order rid work-place of practices fair in form, discriminatory in operation. congress prohibits employers taking adverse employment actions because of race. applying strong-basis-in-evidence standard title vii gives effect both provisions, allowing violations of 1 in name of compliance other in certain, narrow circumstances.
the standard leaves ample room employers voluntary compliance efforts, essential statutory scheme , congress s efforts eradicate workplace discrimination. see firefighters, supra, @ 515.
and standard appropriately constrains employers discretion in making race-based decisions: limits discretion cases in there strong basis in evidence of disparate-impact liability, not restrictive allows employers act when there provable, actual violation.
resolving statutory conflict in way allows disparate-impact prohibition work in manner consistent other provisions of title vii, including prohibition on adjusting employment-related test scores on basis of race. see §2000e–2(l). examinations administered city create legitimate expectations on part of took tests. case promotion exam, of firefighters here invested substantial time, money, , personal commitment in preparing tests. employment tests can important part of neutral selection system safeguards against racial animosities title vii intended prevent. here, however, firefighters saw efforts invalidated city in sole reliance upon race-based statistics. if employer cannot rescore test based on candidates race, §2000e–2(l), follows fortiori may not take greater step of discarding test altogether achieve more desirable racial distribution of promotion-eligible candidates — absent strong basis in evidence test deficient , discarding results necessary avoid violating disparate-impact provision. restricting employer s ability discard test results (and thereby discriminate against qualified candidates on basis of race) in keeping title vii s express protection of bona fide promotional examinations.

next, kennedy inquired whether city s justifications disparate-treatment discrimination met strong basis in evidence standard. concluded did not: if respondents motivated subjective matter desire avoid committing disparate-impact discrimination ... [t]here no evidence — let alone required strong basis in evidence — tests flawed because not job-related or because other, equally valid , less discriminatory tests available city. fear of litigation alone cannot justify employer s reliance on race detriment of individuals passed examinations , qualified promotions.

the test results produced significant racial adverse impact, , confronted city prima facie case of disparate-impact liability. compelled them take hard @ examinations determine whether certifying results have had impermissible disparate impact. problem respondents prima facie case of disparate-impact liability — essentially, threshold showing of significant statistical disparity, , nothing more — far strong basis in evidence city have been liable under title vii had certified results. because city liable disparate-impact discrimination if examinations not job related , consistent business necessity, or if there existed equally valid, less-discriminatory alternative served city s needs city refused adopt. §2000e–2(k)(1)(a), (c). neither condition holds:

respondents raise 3 arguments contrary, each argument fails.




first, respondents refer testimony before csb different composite-score calculation — weighting written , oral examination scores 30/70 — have allowed city consider 2 black candidates then-open lieutenant positions , 1 black candidate then-open captain positions. (the city used 60/40 weighting required contract new haven firefighters union.) respondents have produced no evidence show 60/40 weighting indeed arbitrary. in fact, because formula result of union-negotiated collective bargaining agreement, presume parties negotiated weighting rational reason.
second, respondents argue city have adopted different interpretation of rule of 3 have produced less discriminatory results. respondents claim employing banding here have made 4 black , 1 hispanic candidates eligible then-open lieutenant , captain positions. banding not valid alternative reason: had city reviewed exam results , adopted banding make minority test scores appear higher, have violated title vii s prohibition of adjusting test results on basis of race.
third, , finally, respondents refer statements hornick in telephone interview csb regarding alternatives written examinations. when strong-basis-in-evidence standard applies, respondents cannot create genuine issue of fact based on few stray (and contradictory) statements in record. , there no doubt respondents fall short of mark relying entirely on isolated statements hornick.

he concluded: record in litigation documents process that, @ outset, had potential produce testing procedure true promise of title vii: no individual should face workplace discrimination based on race. respondents thought promotion qualifications , relevant experience in neutral ways. careful ensure broad racial participation in design of test , administration. have discussed @ length, process open , fair. problem, of course, after tests completed, raw racial results became predominant rationale city s refusal certify results. injury arises in part high, , justified, expectations of candidates had participated in testing process on terms city had established promotional process. many of candidates had studied months, @ considerable personal , financial expense, , injury caused city s reliance on raw racial statistics @ end of process more severe. confronted arguments both , against certifying test results — , threats of lawsuit either way — city required make difficult inquiry. hearings produced no strong evidence of disparate-impact violation, , city not entitled disregard tests based solely on racial disparity in results.

our holding today clarifies how title vii applies resolve competing expectations under disparate-treatment , disparate-impact provisions. if, after certifies test results, city faces disparate-impact suit, in light of our holding today should clear city avoid disparate-impact liability based on strong basis in evidence that, had not certified results, have been subject disparate-treatment liability.

concurrence

justice scalia held court declined clarify conflict between title vii s disparate-impact provisions , constitution s guarantee of equal protection. specifically, although court clarified disparate-treatment provisions forbid remedial race-based actions when disparate-impact violation not otherwise result, clear title vii not permits affirmatively requires such [remedial race-based] actions when such violation result. in latter situations, title vii s disparate-impact provisions place racial thumb on scales, requiring employers evaluate racial outcomes of policies, , make decisions based on (because of) racial outcomes. type of racial decision making is, court explains, discriminatory.

dissent

ginsburg, joined stevens, souter , breyer, dissented. have held new haven entitled refrain promoting white firefighters, , concern of being open litigation - whether or not accurate - legitimate.